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MARKETING INTERSTATE HARMONY:
INTERSTATE WATER MARKETS AS AN
ALTERNATIVE TO RESOLVING
WATER CONFLICTS
By Brian Singleterry*
As the population of the American West continues to rise, increasing conflicts over water are inevitable. Complicating matters, the existing supplies are
often far from demands and are often shared between states. To satisfy future
demands, states must learn to transfer and share water. There are currently
three methods for resolving water disputes between states: litigation in the Supreme Court, congressional allocation, and Interstate Compacts. All three are
costly and take many years to reach a conclusion.
However, most resources, like oil or timber, do not require special allocation methods. Instead, the market efficiently and equitably allocates these resources. While requiring regulation, water markets are also able to match
water supply and demand. In recent years, every Western state has increased
support of water markets within its borders.
Encouraging water markets between the states would result in more efficient
and equitable interstate distribution of water. Additionally, water markets increase water-use efficiency and provide incentives to move water to higher
uses. Potential barriers to markets operating between the states are either unconstitutional or insignificant.
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I. INTRODUCTION
North Texas, and its expanding population of more than six million,1 is running out of water.2 By 2060, North Texas will have an
unmet demand of 1.4 million acre-feet of water per year—more than
480 billion gallons.3 While Texas lacks a supply of fresh water to meet
its demand, Oklahoma watches over 8 million acre-feet of water per
year pass through the state and into the Gulf of Mexico.4 This past
summer, the Supreme Court held that an agreement between these
states entitled Oklahoma to that water until it left the state, leaving
Texas dry.5 The decision cost millions of dollars in legal fees and ended a six-year legal battle.6
Water is uniquely allocated between states. Unlike other resources,
where private actors direct the supply through the market, states allocate water by agreement or litigation. Neither option is ideal. Entering into agreements is risky because of the difficulty in amending the
agreement and in predicting the state’s needs decades into the future.
Likewise, litigation is reactive, costly, and unpredictable.
At the same time, western states are increasing the use of water
markets. While implementing water markets present challenges, regulated markets could reduce many allocation problems. But unlike the
market for other goods, political boundaries surround water markets—preventing many water transfers between states.
Interstate water markets are an under-employed alternative to the
traditional allocation methods among states. Water markets would efficiently and equitably allocate water between states. States currently
rely on water markets to redistribute water within their borders.
1. FREESE AND NICHOLS INC. ET AL., 2011 REGION C WATER PLAN § 2.2 (Texas
2011).
2. Id. at ES.6.
3. Id.
4. S. C. Gwynne, The Last Drop, TEX. MONTHLY, Feb. 2008, 170, 269.
5. See Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. 2120, 2129–30 (2013).
6. Joe Wertz, Texas’ Application for Oklahoma Water Still Active Despite Supreme Court Ruling, ST. IMPACT (Oct. 25, 2013, 8:58 AM), http://stateimpact.npr.org/
oklahoma/2013/10/25/texas-application-for-oklahoma-water-still-active-despite-supreme-court-ruling/.
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However, their use as a water allocation mechanism has not been adequately utilized or discussed. This Comment analyzes the use of water
markets to allocate water and to reduce the use of the traditional allocation mechanisms. Section II discusses the background to interstate
water conflicts. Section III explains the current mechanisms for dealing with the conflicts, and their defects. Section IV introduces the
idea of using water markets to allocate water. And lastly, Section V
explores the possible legal constraints on interstate water markets.
II. BACKGROUND
It is ironic that water scarcity is a problem on the blue planet, but in
the western United States it is a reality. As the population continues
to grow, the demand for water will continue to increase. Unfortunately, the increased demand will not be matched by an increased supply. The developing scarcity will make water more valuable and
control over it more contentious.
A. The Hydrologic Cycle
Almost all of humanity’s water needs are met by a small fraction of
the Earth’s water. Less than five one-hundredths of one percent of
the planet’s water is fresh water available for human use.7 A typical
water molecule starts in the ocean, which contains 97.4% of all water,
and evaporates into the sky.8 It then condenses with other molecules
until it becomes heavy enough to fall to the Earth. On land, either as
rain or melting snow, it becomes run-off flowing through streams and
other watercourses. Close to two-thirds of these water molecules
evaporate before reaching the ocean,9 the rest flow through rivers and
lakes back into the ocean or seep beneath the surface into an aquifer.10 Only the run-off water is available for human use.11
Even this small amount of water is unequally distributed on the
land. Except for Washington, Oregon, and Northern California, the
states west of the 100th meridian (which runs through Texas and the
Dakotas) receive less than thirty inches of rain a year, some less than
ten inches.12 In contrast, eastern states receive enough precipitation,
some more than fifty inches a year, to sustain all their needs.13
Droughts and floods exacerbate water problems west of the 100th meridian. Further adding to the difficulties, many scientists believe that
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES, § 2:3 (2013).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Deep underground aquifers are one exception. Id.
Id. § 2:6.
Id.
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these same regions will be especially affected by global climate
change.14
This small amount of water, unevenly distributed across the earth,
must meet all human needs. In the western states, the twenty-first
century goal of water law will be wisely satisfying as many demands as
possible with such a scarce resource.
B. Overview of Water Law
The original colonies became their own separate sovereigns at the
time of independence; the only powers surrendered were those listed
in the Constitution.15 The Constitution contains no explicit powers
over water. By implication, the states retained the power to regulate
and manage water resources.16 New states entering the Union received the same respect and entered the Union on “equal footing” as
the existing states.17 As separate sovereigns, each state is free to create its own law governing water.
The original colonies inherited the doctrine of riparian rights from
England, where the landowner acquires water rights to adjacent
water.18 In the West, water scarcity led to the development of a different doctrine of water rights. That doctrine, known as prior appropriation, severs water rights from land rights.19 Prior appropriation
protects the beneficial use of the first person to divert and appropriate
water from its natural course.20 Then, the water appropriator has a
property right in that water. However, because water is also a public
good, the state retains ownership. Satisfying prior appropriation elements gives the holder only a usufructory right, or a right to use the
water.21
Ground water rules are different.22 The distinction between ground
and surface waters is criticized because all water is part of the same
cycle; however, the laws of many states treat the two differently.23 Initially, ground water was treated as the absolute property of the landowner, subject to capture. Any water that landowners “captured” was
their personal property, similar to the law of oil and gas.24 This is still
the law in some states, including one western state—Texas.25 Today,
14. Noah D. Hall, Interstate Water Compacts and Climate Change Adaptation, 5
ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 237, 243 (2010).
15. Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 283 (1997).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 16–17 (4th ed. 2008).
19. Id. at 22–23.
20. Id. at 77–78.
21. TARLOCK, supra note 7, § 3:3.
22. See id. § 2:4.
23. Id.
24. Id. § 4:6.
25. See Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 831–32 (Tex. 2012).
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many states have replaced the rule of capture with the “reasonable
use” rule or the “American” rule.26 These rules modify the rule of
capture, taking into account the rights of others to use the same
water.27 There is little uniformity.28
Today, governments in every western state (except Colorado)29 require a permit for an individual to acquire a right to surface water.30
This regulation protects existing rights. Without regulation, new
water diversions could prevent water from reaching downstream individuals, denying them the opportunity to fulfill their existing water
rights. Under prior appropriation, the right of existing uses is protected. To protect these existing (senior) rights, agencies provide notice to all right-holders that their rights may be in jeopardy.31
Essentially, the agencies apply prior appropriation, but before the appropriation is made.32 This system also gives the state more control
over water appropriations because the state now has the opportunity
to impose additional requirements.33
The doctrine of prior appropriation has led to the appropriation of
almost all of the water in the western United States.34 However, western water demands continue to increase. This creates political and
legal problems.
C. Interstate Water Allocation Problems
John Wesley Powell was the last great explorer of the American
West.35 In 1869, he departed on his exploration of the western region
and returned with an understanding of western geography and the society it could sustain.36 He realized that the climate of the Western
states could not support American culture as it existed in the Eastern
United States. Unlike in the East, irrigation would be necessary for
farming and cities, making control of water a significant issue.37 The
scarcity of water in the West would be a source of conflict.38
26. TARLOCK, supra note 7, §§ 4:5–4:18.
27. Id. § 4:7.
28. See TARLOCK, supra note 7, § 4:1.
29. OWEN L. ANDERSON ET AL., 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 15.05 (Amy L.
Kelley, ed., 3rd ed. 2014) (Colorado’s system operates similarly, only through courts.)
[hereinafter ANDERSON ET AL., WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS].
30. TARLOCK, supra note 7, § 5:44.
31. Id. § 5:48.
32. ANDERSON ET AL., WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 29, § 15.01.
33. Id.
34. Id. § 14.01(b)(1).
35. JOHN WESLEY POWELL, SEEING THINGS AS A WHOLE: THE ESSENTIAL JOHN
WESLEY POWELL 1 (2004).
36. Id. at 2.
37. JOHN WESLEY POWELL, REPORT OF THE ARID REGION OF THE UNITED
STATES, WITH A MORE DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE LANDS OF UTAH 1 (2nd ed.
1879).
38. Mark Twain supposedly once said, “[w]hiskey is for drinking; water is for fighting over,” but this quote has not been verified. Directory of Mark Twain’s maxims,
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To minimize conflicts, Powell suggested that western states be equal
to a single river basin.39 The democratic process would resolve the
inevitable water conflicts because every person reliant on a river and
its tributaries would be represented by the same state.40 Each state
would distribute its own water resources without impacting unrepresented people.41 However, states were shaped without considering
water, often using rivers as the dividing line between states. This division has forced states to share water resources, compounding the scarcity problem by adding political and legal difficulties.
As Powell predicted, western states have battled for control of
water many times.42 As the population of the western states increases,
more water is diverted out of the rivers and streams. Agriculture, industry, and urban users remove water from the river and reduce flow
to downstream states. This can cause problems for downstream states.
Those states rely on an expected volume of water, but instead they
watch their river shrink to a stream. Quickly developing downstream
states can create problems for upstream states also. As downstream
states grow, they acquire water rights before upstream states have a
chance to develop. This leaves upstream states to watch their water—
and future development—flow out of their state.
Varied development rates between states cause many interstate
conflicts. In a “tragedy of the commons” situation, each state views
other states as competitors for a finite resource.43 An example is the
battle between California and Arizona for Colorado River water.
Since the start of the twentieth century, Arizona has viewed California
as stealing Arizona’s water and feared for its future development.44
The conflict has gone through decades of litigation—even having the
state militia called out at one point—before Congress settled the dispute.45 Arizona did secure legal rights to the Colorado River, but California has not yet reduced its diversions to the legal limit.46
quotations, and various opinions, TWAINQUOTES.COM, http://www.twainquotes.com/
WaterWhiskey.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2014).
39. Donald Worster, Watershed Democracy: Recovering the Lost Vision of John
Wesley Powell, 23 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 57, 58 (2003).
40. See id. at 59–60.
41. JOHN WESLEY POWELL, SEEING THINGS AS A WHOLE: THE ESSENTIAL JOHN
WESLEY POWELL 253–54 (William deBuys, ed., 2001).
42. See GEORGE WILLIAM SHERK, DIVIDING THE WATERS: THE RESOLUTION OF
INTERSTATE WATER CONFLICTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2000) [hereinafter SHERK,
DIVIDING THE WATERS].
43. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1243–44
(1968).
44. Margaret Bushman LaBianca, The Arizona Water Bank and the Law of the
River, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 659, 659–60 (1998).
45. Id. at 665.
46. Robert Jerome Glennon, Coattails of the Past: Using and Financing the Central
Arizona Project, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 677, 712 (1995); see also Where Does Southern
California’s Water Come From?, AQUAFORNIA (Apr. 29, 2008), http://
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While not as dramatic, serious water conflicts continue today. Recently, Texas took Oklahoma to the Supreme Court in an effort to
supply its rapidly growing population with water.47 North Texas is one
of the fastest growing areas of the country but is running low on
water.48 In contrast, Oklahoma watches over 8 million acre-feet of
water per year flow out of the state unused.49 Texas views this as a
wasted economic opportunity,50 but Oklahoma sees things differently.51 Oklahoma sees that water is its future, and it fears that Texas
wants to take the water to fuel Texas’s economic growth.52 The Court
ruled in favor of Oklahoma, preventing Texas from obtaining
Oklahoma’s water.53 While it is too soon to know the consequences,
Dallas-Fort Worth’s growth may be stalled.54
Another consequence of shared water sources is the protection of
inefficient uses. Because prior appropriation rewards the first person
to use a portion of water, most water in the west is already appropriated.55 Irrigation withdraws 31% of all water in the United States56
and is the largest consumptive user, meaning the water is not returned
directly to its source.57 Currently, farmers in the west have little incentive to be more efficient. Some estimates claim redirecting just 7%
of irrigation water to urban uses could meet urban uses for several
years.58 This redirection of water would not necessarily lead to less
food production, as the revenue from the transfer could finance
projects that grow more food with less water.59
web.archive.org/web/20131229205219/http://www.aquafornia.com/index.php/wheredoes-southern-californias-water-come-from.
47. Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. 2120, 2122 (2013).
48. Sidney F. Ansbacher, Tarrant Water District: Another Battle in the TexasOklahoma Water Wars, 43 ABA TRENDS 15 (2012). Also, see generally Gwynne,
supra note 4.
49. Gwynne, supra note 4; A. DAN TARLOCK, ET AL., WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: A CASEBOOK IN LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 6 (2014) (An acre-foot of water
is the amount of water needed to cover an acre of land in water a foot deep.).
50. Complaint for Plaintiff, at 5–6, Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, No.
CIV-07-0045-HE, 2009 WL 3922803 (W.D. Okla. 2009).
51. ROBERT JEROME GLENNON, UNQUENCHABLE: AMERICA’S WATER CRISIS
AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 91–92 (5th ed. 2009).
52. Max B. Baker, Proposal to Capture Water Has Oklahoma Steaming, FORT
WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Jan. 21, 2007, at B6.
53. Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. 2120, 2125 (2013).
54. FREESE AND NICHOLS INC. ET AL., supra note 1, at ES. 4-5. Also, in February
of 2014, Fort Worth considered making water restrictions permanent. Caty Hirst, Fort
Worth Watering Limits Could Become Permanent, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM,
Feb. 18, 2014.
55. ANDERSON ET AL., 2-15 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 29, § 15.05.
56. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SERV., ESTIMATED USE OF WATER IN THE UNITED STATES
IN 2005, 1 (2009).
57. MARC REISNER & SARAH BATES, OVERTAPPED OASIS: REFORM OR REVOLUTION FOR WESTERN WATER 30 (1990).
58. SANDRA POSTEL, LAST OASIS: FACING WATER SCARCITY 171 (1997).
59. Id.
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These inefficient uses are protected by state boundaries because
each state focuses only on its own citizens’ concerns. In some cases
this has led to the enactment of protectionist laws banning the transfer
of water. In every case political boundaries limit the power of states
to redistribute water, even if they are willing. This situation creates
conflicts over the shared resource.
To resolve the water distribution problem, states need to work together to find solutions to problems arising from water transfers. Because of the increasing value of water, the transfers should increase
the efficiency and equity of water use among the states.
III. CURRENT ALLOCATION MECHANISMS
There are three mechanisms used to distribute water between
states: court adjudication by equitable apportionment, congressional
allocation, and allocation under an interstate compact.60 Each
method has benefits and drawbacks. Overall, none of the current options will be adequate in the future with growing demand and a rising
number of conflicts.61
A. Equitable Apportionment
When states have a conflict over water, the Supreme Court is the
arbiter of the dispute. For disputes between states, the Supreme
Court has original jurisdiction.62 A state may sue a neighboring state
to acquire rights to use a portion of a shared water source. In 1907,
the Supreme Court heard its first equitable-apportionment case.63
In Kansas v. Colorado, Kansas sued Colorado to force it to reduce
appropriations and to allow more water into Kansas.64 Kansas governed water by a version of common-law riparianism—every landowner has the right to the natural flow of the adjacent river—and
Kansas claimed its riparian owners were not receiving the natural flow
of the river because of Colorado’s use.65 Colorado governed water by
prior appropriation. It argued that its citizens already had rights to
the water and were putting the water to a beneficial use.66
To settle these competing claims, the Supreme Court created the
doctrine of equitable apportionment. The Court stated that neither
60. GETCHES, supra note 18, at 428, 436, 438.
61. Compare George William Sherk, Equitable Apportionment After Vermejo: The
Demise of a Doctrine, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 565, 578 (1989) [hereinafter Sherk, Equitable Apportionment After Vermejo], with Brian Nath, Importing Solutions: How
Chinese Water Law Principles Can Plug the Holes in U.S. Interstate Water Conflict
Resolution Mechanisms, 27 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 149, 151 (2013).
62. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend . . . to Controversies between two or more states . . . . ”).
63. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
64. Id. at 47–48.
65. Id. at 102–03.
66. See id. at 98.
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state could impose its law on the other because the states are equal to
each other.67 Instead, the Court relied on a higher law—federal common law.68 Because neither state’s law would apply, the Court sought
to “equitably” allocate the water in the river by balancing each state’s
interest.69 Under the doctrine, the Court resolves the dispute on a
case-by-case basis, “without quibbling over formulas.”70
In Kansas v. Colorado, the Court held for Colorado because Colorado benefited more from the water than the water loss harmed Kansas.71 Colorado’s use of the river “transform[ed] thousands of acres
into fertile fields . . . when otherwise they would have continued barren and unoccupied.”72 Further, the Court did not find that Colorado’s use caused substantial harm to Kansas, even near the border.73
The Court did acknowledge that future appropriations by Colorado
could prevent Kansas from receiving an equitable amount of water.74
In the next equitable-apportionment case, Wyoming v. Colorado,
prior appropriation governed both states’ water.75 Strictly enforcing
priorities in both states would not be imposing a foreign policy on
either state because each had the same law. The Court looked to
water conflicts between citizens of different states for guidance.76 In
those cases, the person with the oldest, senior right won.77 But the
Court still did not apply strict appropriation; instead both states were
considered as one, and the senior rights in both states were
protected.78
Future equitable-apportionment cases further developed the doctrine in cases between prior-appropriation states. In Nebraska v. Wyoming, the Court stated that priority would be a “guiding principle,”
but that there are other factors.79 The Court gave an “illustrative and
not exhaustive” list of the factors it considers:
physical and climatic conditions, the consumptive use of water in
the several sections of the river, the character and rate of return
flows, the extent of established uses, the availability of storage
67. Id. at 97.
68. Id. at 96–97. For comment on use of federal common law, see Jay Tidmarsh &
Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 585, 585
(2006) (“Despite Erie’s declaration that ‘[t]here is no federal general common law,’
well established and stable pockets of federal common law persist in . . . disputes
between the states.”).
69. Sherk, Equitable Apportionment After Vermejo, supra note 61, at 567.
70. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 183 (1982) (internal citations omitted).
71. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 117–18 (1907).
72. Id. at 117.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 467 (1922).
76. Id. at 470–71.
77. See, e.g., Bean v. Morris, 221 U.S. 485, 486 (1911).
78. Wyoming, 259 U.S. at 495–96; see also Sherk, Equitable Apportionment After
Vermejo, supra note 61, at 567.
79. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945).
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water, the practical effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas, the
damage to upstream areas as compared to the benefits to downstream areas if a limitation is imposed on the former.80

The Court has even displayed a willingness to reduce existing, senior
rights if it finds those rights are inefficient and equity calls for it.81
The evolution of equitable apportionment has placed great discretion
in judges in applying the flexible standard.82
So far, the Supreme Court has only applied equitable apportionment to surface waters.83 Nothing prevents the Court from applying
the doctrine to ground water. Several cases have implicated ground
water.84 Extending the doctrine to ground water would be more complex than surface water, but the Court has stated that difficulties in
“drafting and enforcing a decree are no justification for [the Court] to
refuse to perform the important function entrusted” to the Court.85
Equitable-apportionment cases place a high burden on the states.
The plaintiff state must show the defendant’s water use is causing actual and substantial damage.86 The possibility or probability of future
harm is not enough. Lack of evidence proving injury causes dismissal
of the case.87 This makes the doctrine reactive, forcing states to wait
until harm has occurred before taking action. To assure adequate evidence, states submit huge quantities of documents. In Kansas v. Colorado, the Court received 122 exhibits totaling 8,559 pages and 347
witness testimonies.88 The clear and convincing standard of proof
adds to the burden.89
Despite these difficulties, equitable apportionment has some positive features. First, it is the only method of allocation that has a guaranteed resolution.90 Congress has only twice allocated water through
legislation91 and seems unwilling to do so in the future.92 Interstate
compacts are the result of long, politicized negotiations that can easily
80. Id.
81. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 187 (1982).
82. Scott T. Anderson et al., Equitable Apportionment and the Supreme Court:
What’s so Equitable About Apportionment?, 7 HAMLINE L. REV. 405, 429 (1984).
83. ANDERSON ET AL., 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 29, § 45.01.
84. See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 515 U.S. 1, 14 (1995).
85. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 616 (1945).
86. Sherk, Equitable Apportionment After Vermejo, supra note 61, at 565–66;
Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 109 (1907).
87. See, e.g., Kansas, 206 U.S. at 117; Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660
(1931).
88. Kansas, 206 U.S. at 105–06.
89. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 393 (1943); Sherk, Equitable Apportionment
After Vermejo, supra note 61, at 566.
90. Nath, supra note 61, at 158.
91. SHERK, DIVIDING THE WATERS, supra note 42, at 24. Although all scholars
agree on these two, scholars debate whether there are other examples of Congressional allocation. See Nath, supra note 61 at 162.
92. SHERK, DIVIDING THE WATERS, supra note 42, at 24.
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end without an agreement.93 Also, the flexibility of the standard allows the Court to apportion water fairly, even if that means disturbing
state property rights.
But each of these benefits has a corresponding negative. The states
will only have a guaranteed resolution if the Court decides to hear the
case. Heightened burdens may be one way for the Court to limit the
number of cases it hears.94 Also, the state must suffer substantial
harm before it can file the case, making prevention of harms impossible. This also prevents upstream states from bringing equitable-apportionment actions. Because the complexity of the litigation, many
years will pass before a resolution, good or bad, occurs.95 This causes
litigation to be expensive and time consuming.
In addition, the doctrine’s flexibility makes the decisions unpredictable and uncertain. The broad standard gives the Court some discretion in applying the law. Issues raised in equitable-apportionment
cases are often technical and fact intensive.96 The Court’s heavy
caseload may make understanding the facts and issues more difficult.
This added uncertainty makes entering litigation a risk for states,
whatever the facts.
B. Congressional Allocation
Allocation of interstate waters by Congress is possible, but rare.
The Commerce Clause of the Constitution authorizes Congress to allocate waters that affect interstate commerce.97 The Court has stated
that congressional approval of interstate compacts is an example of
this exercise of the commerce power.98 This power is also important
in the dormant commerce clause cases.
To date, Congress has apportioned water between states only
twice.99 In one of the two occurrences, Congress’s intent was not
clear.100 In 1963, the Court held, to everyone’s surprise, that Congress
apportioned the Colorado River in the 1922 act authorizing the creation of the Hoover Dam.101 The Court’s holding may have been an
attempt to settle the fifty years of conflict over the river. The second
congressional apportionment was also the result of prolonged conflict,
but congressional intent was clear.102 California, Nevada, Indian
93. JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, INTERSTATE WATER COMPACTS: INTERGOVERNMENEFFORTS TO MANAGE AMERICA’S WATER RESOURCES 29 (2012).
94. Sherk, Equitable Apportionment After Vermejo, supra note 61, at 579–80.
95. See id.
96. John E. Thorson, Visions of Sustainable Interstate Water Management Agreements, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 347, 366 (2003).
97. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 597–98 (1963).
98. Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 564 (1983).
99. SHERK, DIVIDING THE WATERS, supra note 42, at 24. But, see supra note 91.
100. TARLOCK, supra note 7, § 10:29.
101. LaBianca, supra note 44, at 667.
102. See Sherk, Equitable Apportionment After Vermejo, supra note 61, at 26.
TAL
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tribes, and others had fought over rights to Pyramid Lake and the
Truckee and Carson rivers for years.103 With litigation in multiple
courts and petitions to the Supreme Court, Congress intervened in
1990 and apportioned the waters.104
Looking forward, congressional allocation will not be practical.
Historically, Congress has deferred to states’ management of water
resources.105 While Congress certainly has the power to apportion
waters, getting Congress to agree to an allocation will be difficult.106
The politicized nature of Congress does not lend itself well to such an
important and detailed issue as the apportionment of shared waters.
C. Interstate Compact
Interstate Compacts are the last method of resolving interstate
water conflicts. Compacts are agreements among states, ratified and
enforced by the federal government.107 Compacts serve a variety of
purposes: settling boundary disputes, creating advisory commissions,
controlling pollution, developing an interstate region, and managing
interstate resources, to name a few.108 Article I of the Constitution
grants authority to the states to enter into compacts with congressional consent.109 Once Congress approves the compact, it becomes
federal law, preempting any state law.110 The drafters of the Constitution believed this approach furthered a limited federal government.111
Numerous difficulties exist in negotiating a water allocation compact. Quantity is an obvious one. All states sharing water resources
want as much as possible to secure future development.112 But there
are many other difficulties as well. Delivery, existing uses, administration, and enforcing requirements are a sampling of difficult issues.113
These difficulties have made new water-allocation compacts rare.114
While twenty-seven compacts are in force, since 1980 states have entered only five.115
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 23.
106. Paul Kane, 113th Congress, Going Down in History for its Inaction, As a Critical December To-Do List, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 2013, available at 2013 WLNR
30184595.
107. West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 27–28 (1951).
108. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 93, at 47–52.
109. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
110. Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 564 (1983).
111. SHERK, DIVIDING THE WATERS, supra note 42, at 29.
112. Id. at 38.
113. Id.
114. Nath, supra note 61, at 160.
115. Joseph W. Dellapenna, Interstate Struggles Over Rivers: The Southeastern
States and the Struggles Over the ’Hooch, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 828, 836 (2005); JEROME C. MUYS, GEORGE WILLIAM SHERK & MARILYN C. O’LEARY, MODEL INTERSTATE WATER COMPACT 97–499 (2009).
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However, interstate compacts are very attractive to states for other
reasons. First, interstate compacts give the states an opportunity to
allocate resources themselves. Under the other mechanisms, states
are told how much water they are to receive. This process is more in
the spirit of federalism, allowing the states to manage their resources.
Second, interstate compacts may prevent some harms from occurring
by resolving some issues before they arise. And last, interpreting
compacts is more predictable than forecasting outcomes in equitableapportionment cases.116
These benefits have made compacts the preferred method for interstate water allocation. The Supreme Court has recognized the superiority of compacts over equitable apportionment or congressional
allocation.117 The Court has said that water conflicts are “more likely
to be wisely solved by co-operative study and by conference and mutual concession on the part of representatives of the states so vitally
interested in it than by proceedings in any court however constituted.”118 For the most part, western states have followed the Court’s
advice. Only North Dakota and Washington are not parties to a
compact.119
But compacts are not perfect allocation mechanisms either. As discussed, they can be very difficult to negotiate.120 Frequently cited
studies show that compact negotiations often take between four and
nine years.121 Because the compacts must be passed by states legislatures, political interests can impact the negotiations as well.122 Difficult negotiations may create vague, ambiguous, or unworkable
compact provisions that are later subject to litigation.123 For instance,
the Pecos River Compact spawned forty-three years of litigation
resolving measurement and damage provisions.124
Also, compacts are much more difficult to change because they become federal law. States cannot unilaterally revoke or amend a compact.125 In this way, compacts allow the present state legislature to
bind future legislatures.126 Not only does the state have to look out
116. Nath, supra note 61, at 160.
117. See Vermont v. New York, 417 U.S. 270, 276–75 (1974); Texas v. New Mexico,
462 U.S. 554, 565 (1983); Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 501 U.S. 221 (1991).
118. New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 313 (1921).
119. Douglas L. Grant, Interstate Water Allocation Compacts: When the Virtue of
Permanence Becomes the Vice of Inflexibility, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 105, 105 (2003).
120. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 93, at 27–32.
121. Grant, supra note 119, at 19–21.
122. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 93, at 30.
123. SHERK, DIVIDING THE WATERS, supra note 42, at 51–55 (outlining 15 cases
interpreting compact language).
124. Id. at 52–53.
125. Jill Elaine Hasday, Interstate Compacts in a Democratic Society: The Problem
of Permanency, 49 FLA. L. REV. 1, 3 (1997).
126. Id. at 2.
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for its current needs, but also its future needs. This adds to the pressure and difficulty of compact negotiation.
While interstate compacts are the best means for resolving interstate water disputes, negotiations are difficult and the compacts rarely
solve water allocation problems permanently. Recognizing this deficiency, scholars have suggested alternate litigation strategies and negotiation approaches.127 As an alternative to these conflict resolution
mechanisms, individual, voluntary transfers of water could distribute
and allocate water before problems arise. The next Section discusses
interstate water markets and their ability to allocate water.
IV. WATER MARKETING
The voluntary buying and selling of water rights is known as water
marketing. Water transfers across state borders are a form of interstate water allocation—without conflict. Water markets within states
have grown in popularity, but their use in interstate allocation has not
been significantly explored.128 This Section provides some background information about water marketing and then explains how
water markets could play an important role in addressing interstate
allocation problems.
A. Background and Policy
The United States is currently in an era of reallocating water
rights.129 In the West, almost all water has been appropriated, many
sources over-appropriated.130 Because the West developed when agriculture was considered a public good, and prior appropriation encouraged acquiring water rights, irrigation now represents a huge
proportion of water rights.131 However, growing western cities and
increased environmental concerns make reallocation of water necessary to fill these demands.132
Historically, new water supplies were found in the form of constructing dams or tapping aquifers.133 We now know the environmen127. Sherk, Equitable Apportionment After Vermejo, supra note 61, at 580.
128. See generally Olen Paul Matthews & Michael Pease, The Commerce Clause,
Interstate Compacts, and Marketing Water Across State Boundaries, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 601, 601 (2006) (discussing interstate compacts’ effect on water marketing); Allen D. Freemyer & Craig M. Bunnell, Legal Impediments to Interstate Water
Marketing: Application to Utah, 9 J. ENERGY L. & POL’Y 237, 258 (1989); JAMES L.
HUFFMAN, Institutional Constraints on Transboundary Water Marketing, in WATER
MARKETING—THE NEXT GENERATION (Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, eds.,
1997).
129. ANDERSON ET AL., 2-14 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 29,
§ 14.01(b)(1).
130. Id. Over appropriated means that there are more rights to water than water.
131. ANDERSON ET AL., 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 29, § 14.01.
132. Id.
133. Robert Glennon, Water Scarcity, Marketing, and Privatization, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1873, 1876 (2005).
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tal impact of these strategies. Dams radically alter the ecosystem of
rivers, flooding beautiful areas and endangering species.134 We are
also quickly depleting our aquifers, drawing from them much faster
than they recharge.135
Other methods for increasing our water supply are effluent re-use
and conservation.136 Effluent re-use, known as “toilet-to-tap” programs, is a safe way of expanding our water supply, and its use will
increase in the future.137 However, treatment is expensive, and effluent re-use can only marginally contribute in meeting our future demand.138 Water conservation is unquestionably necessary, but who
will conserve and why will they conserve?139 Ultimately, we will have
to fill our wants and needs with the water we currently have, reallocating from uses that do not add value to those that do.
The two methods of reallocating any resource are government regulation and private markets.140 Efficiency should control when reallocating resources because waste is the current problem. In government
regulation, government actors distribute the resource based on valuation of water they assign.141 Although these actors are usually experts
in their field, they have many inputs and constraints. Political pressure from voters, lobbyists, politicians, and polls all could influence
the decision.142 Political actors are shielded from the effects of their
actions, giving them less incentive to distribute efficiently than a private actor has.143 Also, government actors would have to compile and
understand huge amounts of information to distribute wisely.144
For these reasons, markets in some form are seen as a better alternative than regulation.145 The major advantage of markets is efficiency. Owners of property tend to use it more productively.146
Unlike regulations, markets encourage voluntary transfers between
individuals, each person acting in his or her best interest.147 Individuals seeking their own best interest naturally distribute the water to its
134. Id. at 1876–81.
135. TERRY L. ANDERSON ET AL., TAPPING WATER MARKETS 4 (2012) [hereinafter
ANDERSON ET AL., TAPPING WATER MARKETS].
136. Glennon, supra note 133, at 1882.
137. Id. at 1881.
138. Id. at 1881–82.
139. Id. at 1884.
140. ANDERSON ET AL., 2-14 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 29,
§ 14.01(b)(2)(A).
141. ANDERSON ET AL., TAPPING WATER MARKETS, supra note 135, at 12.
142. Id.
143. ANDERSON ET AL., 2-14 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 29,
§ 14.01(b)(1); THOMAS SOWELL, BASIC ECONOMICS: A COMMON SENSE GUIDE TO
THE ECONOMY 17–18 (2011).
144. Sowell, supra note 143, at 17–18.
145. ANDERSON, 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 29, § 14(2)(a).
146. Glennon, supra note 133, at 1887.
147. Id. at 1884.
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most valued use.148 This incentivizes transfers from inefficient uses,
like irrigation, to high value uses in cities.149
Markets also encourage conservation. Prices incentivize conservation by encouraging efficiency and creating opportunity costs in not
selling excess water.150 Also, prices will deter the commencement of
new inefficient uses.151
But water is not just a normal good, and there are special considerations. Externalities (cost felt by parties not involved in the bargain)
are a big concern.152 Because many transfers will probably come from
irrigation and agriculture, farming communities in rural areas could be
hurt.153 Either through direct losses in the form of jobs, crops, or
tourism, or through indirect losses in the form of less business at restaurants or reduced tax base, water transfers could seriously threaten
the West’s rural heritage. The infamous example, one that every rural
community fears, is Owen’s Valley, California, where Los Angeles diverted a river from a thriving farming community until it became a
ghost town.154
A second externality concerns aesthetic, recreational, and wildlife
uses of water, which are difficult to value.155 These uses do have economic value, in the tourism and recreation they create, but there is
more than a monetary value in these uses.156 Often, water is essential
to a community’s identity and is viewed as something that cannot be
valued economically.
As serious as these concerns are, regulated markets can protect
many of these concerns and still offer increased efficiency.157 The essence of the market approach is harnessing the economic incentives
for conservation and reallocation.158 One way to protect rural economies is by compensating these communities for lost water. New capital can be implemented to build a more efficient water system,
allowing rural communities to continue as before the transfer.159
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

ANDERSON ET AL., TAPPING WATER MARKETS, supra note 135, at 15 (2012).
Id.
Id. at 13–15.
Id. at 13–14.
NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST: EFFICIENCY, EQUITY,
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 3 (1992).
153. Id. at 45.
154. See generally MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND
ITS DISAPPEARING WATER (1993).
155. Sherk, Equitable Apportionment After Vermejo, supra note 61, at 581 (1989).
156. ANDERSON, 2-14 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 29, § 14.01(2)(a).
157. Id.
158. Mark Squillace, Comment, The Water Marketing Solution, 42 ENVTL. L. REP.
NEWS & ANALYSIS 10800–01 (2012).
159. Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Teresa A. Rice, Moving Agricultural Water to Cities: The Search for Smarter Approaches, 14 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL L. & POL’Y
105, 107 (2008). In Australia, which has a functioning water market, rural communities have used the income from water sells to increase efficiencies. See Henning Bjor-
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Governments can protect environmental and cultural concerns by
guaranteeing minimal river flows in rivers. These protections, called
“instream flows,” ensure that a minimum amount of water will continue to run through rivers and stay in lakes.160 For instance, Oregon
lawmakers have declared that “[i]t is the policy of the State of Oregon
that establishment of minimum perennial streamflows is a high priority.”161 Additionally, some states allow groups to purchase water
rights for in-stream use.162 These protections can sustain the environment and culture that give the community its identity.
B. Current Status of Water Markets
Transfers of water rights in the West have a long tradition and fit
well within the prior appropriation doctrine.163 The earliest cases of
changes in the place of use,164 place of diversion,165 and nature of
use166 all date back over 100 years. The law of prior appropriation can
handle marketing; it has shown its flexibility.167 Part of the flexibility
is the large number of transfer types. Besides outright transfers of
ownership, there are temporary leases, dry-year options, and conservation transfers.168
Today, water markets are an important mechanism for reallocating
water within states. Beginning in the 1980s, momentum for water
markets increased substantially.169 The period between 1988 and 2008
saw a total of 3,828 water transfers in western states, totaling over 36
million acre-feet of water.170 Surveys of western states show strong
support for water markets.171 In the future, water transfers through
markets are likely to become more common.
While support for water markets is strong, there is little discussion
on interstate markets. However, it is unlikely that political barriers
will continue to prevent transfers. For instance, local communities
along the United States borders with both Canada and Mexico have
nlund, Formal and Informal Water Markets: Drivers of Sustainable Rural
Communities?, 40 WATER RESOURCES RES. W09S07 (2004).
160. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 152, at 80.
161. OR. REV. STAT. § 536.235 (2013).
162. ANDERSON ET AL., TAPPING WATER MARKETS, supra note 135, at 91.
163. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 152, at 2.
164. E.g., Biggs v. Utah Irrigating Ditch Co., 64 P. 494, 500 (Ariz. 1901).
165. Kidd v. Laird, 15 Cal. 161, 162 (1860).
166. Davis v. Gale, 32 Cal. 26, 33–34 (1867).
167. Steven E. Clyde, Adapting to the Changing Demand for Water Use Through
Continued Refinement of the Prior Appropriation Doctrine: An Alternative Approach
to Wholesale Reallocation, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 435, 454–55 (1989).
168. Ronald A. Kaiser, Texas Water Marketing in the Next Millennium: A Conceptual and Legal Framework, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 181, 196–97 (1996).
169. ANDERSON ET AL., 2-14 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 29,
§ 14.01(b)(2)(A).
170. W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N, WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST: PROJECTS, TRENDS
AND LEADING PRACTICES IN VOLUNTARY WATER TRADING 8 (2012).
171. Id. at 29.
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shared water resources for many years.172 In all these situations, the
communities addressed their immediate needs without first awaiting
approval. These examples demonstrate that politics cannot block demand permanently.
C. Relieving Strain on Interstate Allocation Mechanisms
Allowing private persons to transfer water across state lines would
improve the allocation of state waters. Generally, water markets are
limited to a single state. This limited market prevents water from
finding its most valued user and prevents states from developing. In
turn, the unmet demand produces conflicts between the states and results in litigation, congressional apportionment, or negotiation of compacts to settle the conflict. Allowing markets to cross state lines
would alleviate the strain off this system.
No special laws are required to create interstate water markets.
Combine intrastate markets with free commerce between the states
and the result is interstate markets. While some states oppose interstate water transfers, individuals who could profit from the transfer
may not.173 Opening up water users to competition will at least make
them feel the true cost of water.
While interstate markets could exist, the current use of interstate
water markets is unknown. Most research has kept within states borders, ignoring interstate transfers.174 Interstate litigation of water
rights once was more common but is rare today.175 But even in older
cases, it was often new diversions that were litigated, not transfers.176
Markets would reduce water conflicts, and ease tensions between
the states. It may be politically difficult for a state ever to negotiate
away water. Instead, politicians could strengthen property rights in
water, and allow the market’s “invisible hand” to make the transfer.
Although both are political choices, one is more politically viable.
This takes the difficult choice off of the politicians. And, the same
private interests who were against interstate transfers may be for markets because they might be the ones profiting from transfers.
172. See Patrick Forest, A Century of Sharing Water Supplies Between Canadian
and American Borderland Communities, MUNK SCH. BRIEFINGS, at 2 (2010); Gabriel
Eckstein, Rethinking Transboundry Ground Water Resources Management: A Local
Approach along the Mexico-U.S. border, 25 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 95, 96 (2013).
173. Oklahoma prevented the city of Hugo from entering into a contract to sell a
Dallas suburb water. City of Hugo v. Nichols, 656 F.3d 1251, 1254 (10th Cir. 2011).
174. See NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 152, at 19; W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N, supra
note 170, at xi.
175. DOUGLAS L. GRANT, 3-48 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 44.01 (Amy L.
Kelly et al. eds., 3rd. ed. 2014).
176. See, e.g., Howell v. Johnson, 89 F. 556, 557 (Mont. Cir. Ct. 1898); Conant v.
Deep Creek & Curlew Val. Irrigation Co., 66 P. 188, 189 (1901); Willey v. Decker, 73
P. 210, 201 (1903).
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Also, interstate markets would expose inefficient uses to new competition. Irrigators and other inefficient users may not have many potential buyers if they are in a less developed state. However, cities in
nearby states may be very interested in buying some of their water.
One of the key factors in getting a market to work efficiently is a
critical mass of buyers and sellers.177 Making political borders irrelevant is necessary to maximize the pool of market participants.
While water markets may reduce the strain on traditional interstate
water allocation mechanisms, there are legal hurdles that must first be
cleared.
V. LEGAL OBSTACLES

TO

INTERSTATE WATER MARKETS

Water markets are gaining in popularity and are operating in every
western state.178 There are two issues that could block the operation
of interstate water markets. First, state laws that discriminate based
on state citizenship place an undue burden on interstate markets. The
dormant commerce clause should remove this obstacle. Second, interstate compacts could shield protectionist laws from the dormant commerce clause. However, most compacts should not be interpreted to
interfere with interstate markets.
A. Protectionist State Laws
Protectionist laws seek to prevent water, or other goods, from leaving the state. The dormant commerce clause of the Constitution prevents states from isolating themselves in this way. States should not
be able to place undue burdens on commerce among the states. Economic protectionism concerned our founding fathers and helped generate support for the Constitutional Convention. Also, free
commerce is central to American life.
The modern dormant commerce clause has two parts. First, it asks
whether the statute discriminates against out-of-state citizens either
facially or through application. If the statute does discriminate, then it
receives strict judicial scrutiny, meaning there must be no less discriminatory alternative and the discrimination serves a substantial state
purpose. Second, if the statute does not discriminate, then the benefits of the statute to the state are weighed against the burdens the
statute places on commerce.
The Supreme Court case of Sporhase v. Nebraska179 applied the
dormant commerce clause to water. The decision seemed to have removed the threat of protectionist laws from interstate water markets.
However, there have been few cases to clarify the scope of the
Sporhase, leaving many details unknown.
177. Kaiser, supra note 168, at 209.
178. W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N, supra note 170, at vii.
179. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 941 (1982).

546

TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2

In Sporhase, Justice Stevens stated there were three issues to analyze when applying the dormant commerce clause to protectionist
water laws. First, is water an article of commerce for dormant commerce clause purposes? This is a threshold question to dormant commerce clause issues. Second, does the protectionist statute violate the
dormant commerce clause? And third, even if the statute does violate
the dormant commerce clause, is there an exception for the statute?180
1. Is Water is an Article of Commerce?
Originally, the dormant commerce clause did not apply to water.181
In Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, New Jersey prevented a
water diversion that would be sold to New York City.182 The Court
held that New Jersey owned all the water in the state and was able to
regulate it as it decided. This decision prevented unappropriated
water from leaving the state. Encouraged by this decision, many
states enacted protectionist legislation preventing out-of-state
diversions.
However, the momentum soon turned the other way as the Court
abandoned the state-ownership theory.183 In City of Altus v. Carr, the
dormant commerce clause voided a Texas statute preventing the transfer of ground water across state lines.184 However, Texas law was unusual because water became personal property after it was pumped
from the ground.185 A few years later, the Supreme Court got a
chance to review the legal fiction of state-ownership as applied to
water.
In Sporhase v. Nebraska, a Nebraska statute prevented interstate
transfers of water without a permit.186 Nebraska passed the statute on
the reasoning in Hudson County that state-ownership of the resource
allowed the state to protect it.187 The farmer had a well in Nebraska
and used it to water his land that straddled the Colorado–Nebraska
border.188 The farmer never applied for the permit. The use of the
water in Colorado was at issue.
Nebraska argued that the dormant commerce clause did not apply
to water for two reasons. First, it argued state ownership.189 It distinguished City of Altus because the property interest created after
pumping the water was different.190 In Texas, the water was personal
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 943.
Hudson Cnty Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 357 (1908).
Id. at 353.
See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 323 (1979).
City of Altus v. Carr, 255 F. Supp. 828, 840 (W.D. Tex. 1966).
Id.
Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 943–44 (1982).
GRANT, supra note 175, § 48.01.
Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 944.
Id. at 948.
Id. at 950–51.
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property once captured. But in Nebraska the water was still subject to
state regulation.191 However, the Nebraska water remained subject to
sale.192 Nebraska sanctioned sales of ground water to cities.193 This
demonstrated that state ownership was a legal fiction and did not exempt water from the dormant commerce clause.
Second, Nebraska argued that water is a unique resource that
should be treated differently than other goods.194 Water is essential
for human survival. This gives the state a special interest in regulating
and preserving water for its citizens.195 The Court disagreed.196 It
noted that only a small percentage of water is used for human survival; agriculture and industry use and consume much greater quantities. Allowing Nebraska to protect its water resources would give
Nebraska an economic advantage over other states.
Additionally, the Court had policy reasons for holding water as an
article of commerce. Congress can only regulate “articles of commerce” under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. The Court
wanted to ensure that water was an “article of commerce” so Congress could regulate water in the future if needed.197 The dissent argued that the Commerce Clause would probably extend to water
without such a broad ruling because water affects interstate
commerce.198
Another question, not raised in Sporhase but impacting interstate
water marketing, is what happens if the state does not allow any transfers of water. Currently, all western states do allow transfers,199 but a
state could prohibit all transfers as an extreme attempt to protect
water.200 If the state did not give the right to transfer water to anyone
in the state, it would be difficult to claim that water was an article of
commerce.201 However, even this contingency may be unsuccessful at
protecting water because it would still likely affect interstate commerce and fall under the dormant commerce clause umbrella. This
would be an extreme act by the state, and still may not exempt water
from markets.
191. Id. at 951.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 952.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 953.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 961–62.
199. W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N, supra note 170, at 7.
200. Mark S. Davis & Michael Pappas, Escaping the Sporhase Maze: Protecting
State Waters Within the Commerce Clause, 73 LA. L. REV. 175, 206 (2012) (suggesting
that state’s definition of property rights could have an impact on dormant commerce
clause cases).
201. See Mark P. Gergen, The Selfish State and the Market, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1097,
1147 (1988).
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Thus, Sporhase held that water is an article of commerce. The only
cases interpreting Sporhase are two companion cases, known as El
Paso I202 and El Paso II.203 In El Paso I, the court summarily dismissed the claim that water was not an article of commerce.204 While
the issue may not always be as simple as El Paso I presented it, the
dormant commerce clause likely will apply to protectionist state
statutes.
2. Does the Statute Place an Undue Burden on Interstate
Commerce?
Once the court determines the dormant commerce clause applies, it
must decide if the statute discriminates. Discriminatory statutes receive strict scrutiny and almost never survive—while nondiscriminatory statutes face a balancing test. First, this section analyses
nondiscriminatory statutes, then discriminatory statutes. And finally,
examples of protectionist water statutes are analyzed to determine
their constitutionality.
a. Nondiscriminatory Statutes
Statutes that treat citizens and noncitizens alike are subject to the
balancing test pronounced in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.205 Nondiscriminatory statutes that serve a “legitimate local public interest” with
only incidental burdens on commerce will be upheld “unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits.”206
The Nebraska statute207 in Sporhase had four requirements for issuing a permit.208 The statute stated:
Any person, firm, city, village, municipal corporation or any other
entity intending to withdraw ground water from any well or pit located in the State of Nebraska and transport it for use in an adjoining state shall apply to the Department of Water Resources for a
permit to do so. If the Director of Water Resources finds that the
withdrawal of the ground water requested is reasonable, is not contrary to the conservation and use of ground water, and is not otherwise detrimental to the public welfare, he shall grant the permit if
the state in which the water is to be used grants reciprocal rights to
202. City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 563 F. Supp. 379, 380 (D.N.M. 1983) [hereinafter
El Paso I].
203. City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 597 F. Supp. 694, 697 (D.N.M. 1984) [hereinafter
El Paso II].
204. El Paso I, 563 F. Supp. at 388.
205. Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
206. Id.
207. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 944 (1982) (quoting NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 46-613.01 (1978)).
208. Id.
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withdraw and transport ground water from that state for use in the
State of Nebraska.209

The first three requirements—reasonable, not contrary to the conservation and use of ground water, and not detrimental to the public welfare—were determined to be neutral because similar requirements
applied to Nebraska citizens for instate permits.210 Also, the requirements did not mention citizenship. This portion of the law was analyzed under the Pike balancing test.
In weighing the benefits to Nebraska against the burdens on interstate commerce, the Court first looked at the claimed benefit Nebraska would receive. In Sporhase, Nebraska’s only stated policy for
the statute was conservation of its ground water.211 The Court acknowledged conservation as a legitimate purpose, but failed to clearly
state why. The Court indicated the “confluence of several realities”
made the requirements legitimate.212 The Court listed four such realities: physical well-being, legal expectations, state-ownership claims,
and public policy. All realities revolved around water shortages justifying the purpose.213
The first reason was protecting the physical well-being of the state’s
citizens, and not just economic benefit.214 In El Paso I, New Mexico
argued that its statute was needed for the health of its citizens, because New Mexico has few water resources.215 However, the court
interpreted this reason very narrowly, stating that “[o]utside of fulfilling human survival needs, water is an economic resource.”216 In this
context, the physical well-being justification could only apply in extreme circumstances because most droughts—even serious droughts—
do not get to the level where people are dying of dehydration. Defined this narrowly, physical well-being will not likely weigh heavily in
future cases.
The second reason focused on legal expectations created by the current interstate allocation mechanisms.217 As explained earlier, economic consequences are considered in those decisions. In dictum, the
Court stated that equitable apportionment might not protect inefficient uses.218 Therefore, legal expectations based on equitable appor209. Id.
210. See id. at 955–56.
211. See id. at 954.
212. Id. at 956.
213. See id. at 956–57; see also Frank J. Trelease, Interstate Use of Water—Sporhase
v. El Paso, Pike & Vermejo, 22 LAND & WATER L. REV. 315, 321–22 (1987) (arguing
that “shortage” in the West is almost meaningless because water is so scarce); GRANT,
supra note 175, § 48.03(a)(2).
214. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 956.
215. El Paso II, 563 F. Supp. 379, 380–81 (D.N.M. 1983).
216. Id. at 389–90.
217. See id.
218. Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 323–24 (1984).
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tionment may not assist states in protecting water. Because most
transfers will be from inefficient uses in one state to high value uses in
another, the origin state will not have a legal expectation. Equitable
apportionment would not protect inefficient uses. Also, interstate
compacts could not create expectations that affect interstate markets.
Interstate compacts only apply to unappropriated water. Water transfers only draw from appropriated water because someone must have
the right to sell. Thus, legal exceptions cannot contribute to justifying
conservation.
Third, the Court stated that the state-ownership fiction may “support a limited preference for its own citizens in the utilization of the
resource.”219 Apparently, the Court sees state water ownership as
more credible than state wild-animal ownership.220 Similar language—stating water was necessary for the public welfare—was interpreted in El Paso II.221 The New Mexico statute allowed the export to
be denied if the export was “detrimental to the public welfare of the
citizens of New Mexico.”222 The Court acknowledged that economic
interests could be considered in this term, as well as “health, safety,
recreational, aesthetic, and environmental interests.”223 But if the
phrase is used simply as a tool for economic protectionism, it will be
unconstitutional.224 This is the strongest argument for states trying to
protect water from export.
The last justification for finding conservation a legitimate purpose
was the state furthers good public policy when it preserves publicly
owned resources in times of shortage.225 The Court cited to Reeves,
Inc. v. Stake226 when describing the justification.227 Reeves is an example of an exception to the dormant commerce clause: the market participant doctrine.
The “confluence” of these realities is then weighed against the burdens on commerce. In weighing the burdens on interstate commerce,
the facts are important. In Sporhase, the Court held that Nebraska’s
benefits were greater than the burden on interstate commerce.228 The
measures included in the statute—reasonable withdrawals, conservation of ground water, and preserving the public interest—were “legiti219. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 956.
220. Compare Greer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 519 (1896) (holding state ownership of wild animals), with Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 322 (1979) (overruling
Greer and holding that the state ownership in wild animals is an unenforceable legal
fiction).
221. El Paso II, 597 F. Supp. at 700.
222. Id. at 697.
223. Id. at 700.
224. Id. at 701.
225. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 957 (1982).
226. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
227. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 957.
228. Id. at 956.
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mate reasons” for denying interstate transfers if violated.229 Equally
important, Nebraska also imposed similar conditions on groundwater
use in the state.230 Sporhase also involved very little burden on commerce (one farmer irrigating his fields), making the weighing easier.
In future cases, this balancing may be difficult. Cities and urban
uses are likely candidates to receive interstate transfers, and denying
the transfer would place a significant burden on commerce. There is
no precedent for this situation. Ultimately, the application of the law
will likely determine how the Court would rule on the situation. If the
statute is applied in a nondiscriminatory way, it would probably be
upheld.
b. Discriminatory Statutes
However, the law may not be neutral, but instead discriminatory. A
law can be discriminatory because of its purpose or impact. In Philadelphia v. New Jersey, the state of New Jersey prevented states from
importing trash into its borders because it was preserving the land for
its own waste.231 The state impermissibly discriminated by treating
the request differently because of its state of origin.
Likewise, the Court held the fourth requirement in the Nebraska
statute—granting a permit only if the receiving state reciprocated—
discriminated against interstate commerce.232 The requirement only
allowed water exports to states that allowed water imports to Nebraska.233 This requirement was an “explicit barrier to commerce between the two states.”234 Similarly, the New Mexico statute imposing
a two-year moratorium on all water exports was deemed to have a
discriminatory purpose.235 Both these requirements are distinguished
from the nondiscriminatory criteria because of the additional burden
on out-of-state citizens.
Discriminatory statutes face a more demanding test.236 There is a
presumption that discriminatory laws are unconstitutional.237 To
overcome the presumption, the purpose of the law must be legitimate
and not merely economic protection.238 Also, there must not be a less
discriminatory way of achieving that purpose.239
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
§ 5.3.6
238.
239.

Id. at 955.
See id. at 956.
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 617 (1978).
Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 957.
Id. at 958.
Id. at 957.
See El Paso II, 597 F. Supp. at 707.
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986).
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES
(2011).
Maine, 477 U.S. at 148.
Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 954; Maine, 477 U.S. at 138.
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In Sporhase, Nebraska only gave one justification for the reciprocity
requirement: to conserve ground water.240 While the Court recognized this as a legitimate interest, it said that the “close fit between the
reciprocity requirement and its asserted local purpose” was utterly
lacking.241 The statute could block exports to a drought-stricken state
even if Nebraska was flooded with water.
However, the Court noted that it was conceivable that a state could
produce this evidence.242 This leaves open the possibility that even a
total ban could be valid if the state were so dry that a total ban was
the least discriminatory alternative. This small hope will be difficult to
prove, as economic needs are not considered.243 The severity of the
situation must be along the health, environment, and recreational
grounds outlined above. While possible, the Court will hold most discriminatory statutes unconstitutional.
c. Sample Protectionist Statutes
Overall, the dormant commerce clause protects water marketing
between states. Below, various types of statutes employed to restrict
water exports will be analyzed under Sporhase to determine whether
the statutes violate the Constitution.
Public Welfare or Public Interest Criteria. In the wake of Sporhase,
El Paso I, and El Paso II, many states updated their water export
statutes to comply with the decisions. Learning from these cases, several states use public welfare criteria to determine if the export will be
allowed.244 Although there are differences between the individual
statutes, all share the same basic form.
The public welfare criteria are facially neutral but could be applied
discriminatorily. Assuming every proposed transfer (both instate
transfers and exports) is judged equally under this standard, most decisions would be upheld. Transfers would likely be from inefficient,
low value uses. Even if the water is leaving the state, it may be difficult to argue that the transfer is not in the public interest because of
the reduction of waste. However, the state may be able to deny the
permit if the transfer harms in-stream flows or other cultural and environmental uses. The important consideration is that the transferee’s
state of citizenship not be a factor.
240. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 954.
241. Id. at 957.
242. Id. at 958.
243. See Davis & Pappas, supra note 200, at 210–15.
244. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-292 (2012); COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-81101(3) (2013); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 42-203A(5), -222(1), -401 (2003 & Supp. 2013);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-402(6) (2013); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-613.01 (LexisNexis 2012); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.520 (LexisNexis 2012); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 72-12B-1 (1997); and UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3a-108(1)(b)(i)(C) (LexisNexis 2012).
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Legislative Approval. Six states require legislative approval of
water exports.245 While the details vary between the statutes, these
appear to facially discriminate against interstate commerce. These
statutes only apply this requirement to out-of-state water transfers;
therefore, there must be a legitimate purpose for this requirement and
no less discriminatory means. Certainly, the requirement cannot be
said to have a purpose other than to discourage such transfers. It
would be politically unpopular to allow these transfers, which seems
to be the purpose. Also, the normal administrative process would
handle these transfers less discriminatorily and more efficiently.
These laws are likely to be found unconstitutional if they were to be
challenged.
Common-Law Requirements. The common-law appropriation doctrine, which many states codified, required parties to satisfy several
elements to transfer water. For instance, most state-transfer laws contained a beneficial-use element—ensuring the water would not be
wasted.246
The most significant element is the no-injury rule. If interstate
transfers become more common, then it may block exports of water.
Under the no-injury rule, a water transfer must not injure any other
appropriators from the same body of water.247 This rule protects third
parties to the transaction.248 However, application of the rule could
prevent interstate transfers.
These rules should be facially neutral. The beneficial use rule essentially protects against waste, and makes no mention of the transferee’s state citizenship. Similarly the no-injury rule assesses objective
criteria. Since the rules are facially neutral, the benefits of the rule
must outweigh the burdens on interstate commerce. The beneficial
use rule helps protect against waste. The no-injury rule is necessary to
protect the property rights of others in water.249 Protection of rights
itself is a legitimate goal, but it is also necessary to ensure a functioning market.250 Therefore, as long as the rules are applied without re245. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-108 (2003); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-402(5)-(6)
(2013); OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, §§ 105.12A(D), 1085.2(2) (2013); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 537.810 - .870 (2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 46-5-20.1 (2004); and WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 41-3-115 (2013).
246. See Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 56
(Colo. 1999).
247. For an early expression of the rule, see, e.g., Butte T. M. Co. v. Morgan, 19 Cal.
609, 616 (1862) (the rule is that a “change must not injuriously affect the rights of
others”). For a current example, see, e.g., TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.134 (West
2008).
248. George A. Gould, Conversion of Agricultural Water Rights to Industrial Use,
27 B. ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1791, 1820–21 (1982).
249. TERRY L. ANDERSON ET AL., TAPPING WATER MARKETS, supra note 135, at
59–60.
250. See id.
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gard to citizenship, a denial of the right to transfer water out of state is
constitutional because of the no-injury rule.
Area-of-Origin Protection. Some statutes restrict exports to protect
the originating basin or watershed.251 The statutes aim to protect the
basin’s current and future water needs. The needs include protecting
the ecosystem, economy, and culture.252 These types of statutes do
not facially discriminate because they apply to all transfers of water
that remove water from the basin, regardless of the water’s destination. However, judges should look closely to make sure there statute
is applied neutrally. Interstate and intrastate transfers should be assessed the same way. States cannot use this statute as a disguise to
protect its water.
If the statue is applied neutrally, the Pike balancing test should be
applied to determine if the benefit to the state outweighs the burdens
on interstate commerce. The facts of the transfer will be critical, so
generalities are hard to state. The basin’s needs are broader than criteria that the Sporhase court outlined as relevant factors in determining how beneficial the statute is to the state.253 These statutes are not
designed to prevent water exports, but to protect the water basin. The
benefits that the basin receives would be significant and important.
However, this type of statute would be a heavy burden on commerce, both intrastate and interstate.254 These restrictions go beyond
considering just water rights, and seek to preserve the status quo.255
This system benefits inefficient water uses. By removing restrictions,
efficiency will increase—both in the basin and out of it. After efficiency increases are accounted for, the basin’s water needs may still be
met, and the transferred water would be put to a higher valued use.256
The constitutionality of this type of statute is the most difficult to
predict because the facts will be so important. For states that want to
protect their water resources from leaving the state, it is also their best
bet. However, states cannot have it both ways. This statute will be
most effective if all transfers out of the originating basin are carefully
scrutinized. But this scrutiny will make transfers within the state more
difficult as well. Thus, states that attempt this measure will not be
able to capture all the efficiency gains that water markets offer.
251. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.035 (2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1501, -1502
(Supp. 2011); OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 105.12(A)(4) (2013); TEX. WATER CODE ANN.
§ 11.085(1) (West Supp. 2013).
252. ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.035 (2012).
253. These needs are from the “confluence of several realities,” including protection of the state’s citizens well-being, the state’s legal expectations, state limited preference for its own citizens, and good public policy. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S.
941, 956–57 (1982).
254. See TERRY L. ANDERSON ET AL., TAPPING WATER MARKETS, supra note 135,
at 60.
255. See id.
256. See id.
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3. Do Any Exceptions Apply?
The third question the Court asked in Sporhase was whether Congress had given Nebraska permission to burden interstate commerce?257 Two exceptions to the dormant commerce clause are
recognized.258 First, the market-participant doctrine allows states to
discriminate when they are not regulators, but simply participants in
the market. Second, Congress can preempt the dormant commerce
clause and allow states to discriminate. Regarding water markets, this
issue will most likely emerge because of interstate water compacts.
Ultimately, neither exception is likely to prevent water marketing.
a. Market Participant
The market-participant exception allows a state to discriminate
when it is operating within the market and is not regulating it.259 The
key case is Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, where a state-owned cement plant
gave preference to its own citizens.260 The dormant commerce clause
was not intended to “limit the ability of the states themselves to operate freely in the free market.”261
Some states have grasped at this idea as a method of preventing
water exports. While the state may not be able to prevent exports
through statute, they may be able to appropriate water rights themselves, and then sell to in-state residents only. Idaho,262 Montana,263
and New Mexico264 all have statutes applying this approach. These
statutes have no effect on water appropriated by private persons. The
only effect may be that the state acts as another competitor in the
market, buying rights from its citizens instead of out-of-state citizens.
As long as it competes fairly, the state should not be prevented from
buying rights.
But even this limited application of the exception may have a fault.
It is unclear if natural resources, like water, are applicable to the market participant exception.265 In Reeves, the Court distinguished a
state’s resource hoarding from the sale of cement, reasoning that “cement is not a natural resource, like coal, timber, wild game, or minerals.”266 Distinguishing between natural resources and products that
are of human creation makes the applicability of water to the excep257. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 943.
258. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 237, § 5.3.7.
259. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976).
260. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 432–33 (1980).
261. Id. at 437.
262. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-1501 (2003).
263. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-301(2), -141(10) (2013).
264. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-14-43, -44 (1997).
265. Stephanie Landry, Comment, State Immunity from the Dormant Commerce
Clause: Extension of the Market-Participant Doctrine from State Purchase and Sale of
Goods and Services to Natural Resources, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 515 (1985).
266. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 443–44 (1980).
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tion questionable. However, even if the exception does apply, marketing would likely be little affected because private rights are still
protected.
b. Congressionally Approved Restrictions
The last exception to the dormant commerce clause is Congressional approval of the export restriction.267 To protect the statute,
Congress’s consent must be “expressly stated.”268 One case demonstrates how high this burden is. In South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, a state law imposing conditions on timber
exports mirrored federal policy.269 The Court held that agreement of
policies alone was not enough to demonstrate congressional intent;
approval of the restriction must be “unmistakably clear.”270
In Sporhase, Nebraska argued that Congress had approved its export restrictions.271 It claimed thirty-seven federal statutes and several interstate compacts showed deference to state water laws.272 The
Court held congressional intent was not present.273 However, interstate water compacts could hamper water marketing. In Sporhase, the
water being exported was not included in any compact. The next section will discuss the impact of interstate compacts on water marketing.
B. Interstate Compacts
A second potential obstacle to interstate water marketing is interstate compacts. States enter into compacts between themselves to
solve a variety of problems, including water allocation. Interstate
compacts must be approved by Congress to become effective; once
approved, they have the status of federal law. As federal law, compacts would preempt any state law. To prevent any interstate transfers of water, Congress must have “expressly stated” its intent in
“unmistakably clear” language.274
However, most compacts are completely silent on transfers.275 With
no clear language in the compact, normal state transfer laws should
apply.276 Some compacts go further, expressly stating that normal
state water laws apply where the compact is silent.277 Also, some
267. Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159
(1985).
268. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 960.
269. S.-Cent. Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 92–93 (1984).
270. Id. at 91.
271. See Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 958.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 959–60.
274. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 91.
275. Matthews & Pease, supra note 128, at 627–28.
276. Id. at 628.
277. See, e.g., Red River Compact, Pub. L. 96-564, 94 Stat 3305, art. II, § 2.01 (1980)
(codified as amended at TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 46.013 (West 1979).
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compacts have language protecting existing water rights.278 In the
West, water rights include the right to transfer.279 A compact that
took rights away from their holder could run into unconstitutionaltaking problems.280
There are a few compacts that may contain language that restricts
water markets. For example, the Yellowstone River Compact states,
“no water shall be diverted from the Yellowstone River Basin without
the unanimous consent of all signatory states.”281 In Intake Water Co.
v. Yellowstone River Compact Commission, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals interpreted this language as congressional approval of restrictions on interstate commerce.282 Unlike the water in Sporhase, the
transferred water was included in the compact.283 In this way, the Yellowstone River Compact is exceptional.
Also, language allocating water in perpetuity, or something similar,
may restrict marketing. Some compacts use language that is similar to
perpetuity. For example, “free and unrestricted use” to water within
the state.284 This language should not be seen as congressional consent to restricting transfers. Instead, it should be interpreted as allowing state law to control water. The normal water transfer laws of
the state should apply. Even the Colorado River Compact, which expressly states the allocation is permanent, is being interpreted this
way.285
Overall, compacts should not restrict water markets. When compacts do have language restricting transfers, the compact controls, but
those compacts are rare.286 Private markets and interstate compacts
should be able to coexist, with state laws controlling transfers.
VI. CONCLUSION
More widespread use of interstate water markets would create a
more equitable and efficient allocation of water than currently exists.
Also, increased use of interstate water markets could reduce interstate
conflicts. Current water conflicts end up in expensive and lengthy resolution mechanisms that often do not provide solutions. Markets are
flexible, existing mechanisms for avoiding these conflicts.
278. See, e.g., Yellowstone River Compact, Pub. L. 82-231, 65 Stat. 663, art. V(d)
(1951) (codified as amended at W.S. 1977 § 41-12-601).
279. TARLOCK, supra note 7, § 5:72.
280. Matthews & Pease, supra note 128, at 635–36.
281. Yellowstone River Compact, Pub. L. 82-231, 65 Stat. 663, art. X (1951).
282. Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone River Compact Comm’n, 769 F.2d 568,
569–70.
283. Id. at 569.
284. See, e.g., Red River Compact, art. IV, §§ 4.02(b), 4.03(b), art. VI, § 6.04(b),
art. VII, § 7.02(b).
285. Matthews & Pease, supra note 128, at 628–30.
286. Id. at 627–28.
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Intrastate water markets are growing in use and have a successful
record of reallocating water. As the use of water markets increases,
interstate transfers will become more common. Eventually, protectionist statutes will either be found unconstitutional or be interpreted
to allow interstate transfers. When the obstacles do fall, there should
be less conflict between the states and more efficient use of this essential resource.

